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Abstract: 
What motivates copyright owners to seek the removal of unauthorised derivative 
works such as parody and remix? In January 2012, the researchers constructed an 
independent dataset of 1845 potentially infringing music video parodies on YouTube 
referencing 343 top-100 charting commercial music tracks in the UK. At a 12-months 
interval, in January 2013, the dataset was re-examined to identify parody videos taken 
down at the request of rightsholders over the preceding year. The researchers 
determine the overall frequency of YouTube takedowns for this sample (15.5%) and 
hypothesize factors that predict the likelihood of a takedown notice. Songs originating 
in the EU were subject to a higher rate of takedown than those originating in the USA, 
suggesting that the “fair use” concept does have an impact on takedown. Apart from 
(1) territory, we find that the only significant predictors of takedowns are (2) the 
presence of a copied sound recording in the parody video (presumably by an 
automated identification process), and (3) the level of skill apparent in the production 
of the parody, with low-skill parodies taken down more frequently. Other concerns 
expressed by rightsholders, such as negative reputational effects caused by 
inappropriate use (potential moral rights infringements), do not appear to predict 
takedowns. Popularity (viewing figures) or content (the critical stance of the parodist 
toward the original work) do not trigger a systematic response from rights holders. 
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Introduction 
 
When users appropriate, remix, mash-up or parody existing cultural materials, 
they are highly likely to infringe the copyright of the rightsholders in the original 
work. International legal norms prescribe far-reaching exclusive rights that prevent 
derivative re-use, and exceptions to these rights in national laws have to be specific, 
non-prejudicial to the author, and not in conflict with normal exploitation5.  The 
owner of the copyright work can act more or less aggressively to police and remove 
such derivative infringing content, with resource costs associated with more 
aggressive enforcement.  Rightsholders must make a determination about whether and 
when to act: particularly in the case of owners of large catalogues of material. Which 
material should they spend resources protecting, and which types of infringement 
should they most aggressively pursue?  Should amateur karaoke covers and parodies 
be approached in the same way as incidents of outright piracy?  If not, where do 
copyright owners draw the line and what in particular triggers a removal request?   
The study presented in this paper examined 1845 parodies based on 343 
commercial pop music videos on YouTube. The researchers revisited the original 
dataset of user-generated parodies 12 months later and re-checked each of the original 
URLs to ascertain whether the video was still live on the YouTube platform and if 
not, the reason for its removal. This enabled the researchers to empirically test the 
relationship between likelihood of a takedown and features of a video such as its 
genre, production values, and the territory of its creator. 
As part of a suite of copyright reforms aimed at encouraging innovation and 
growth, the UK government proposed in 2012 to create a new “fair dealing” 
exception for parody and pastiche6.  Certain music rightsholders were opposed to the                                                         5 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886, Art. 9(2). The latest 
version of the Berne Convention is the Paris Act 1971, as amended in 1979. All EU countries are 
members, and the US acceded to Berne in 1989. In 1994, the Berne Convention (with the exception of 
Art. 6bis on “moral rights”) was incorporated into the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently has 159 
member countries (as of 2 March 2013), making Berne copyright norms binding on most of the world. 
6 The UK Intellectual Property Office has consulted on draft legislation inserting a new section 30B 
into the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988: “Copyright in a copyright work is not infringed by 
any fair dealing with the work for the purposes of caricature, parody or pastiche.” (published for 
technical review on 7 June 2013: http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/hargreaves/hargreaves-
copyright/hargreaves-copyright-techreview.htm)  
In the United States, parodies typically fall under ‘fair use’ (section 107, Copyright Act 1976). Under 
the fair use doctrine, factors to consider include the purpose and character (e.g. commercial/non-profit 
educational use), substantiality of the portion used, and the effect of the use upon the potential market. 
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plan, arguing that it undermined their economic interests. This paper explores 
specifically if music rightsholders were protecting their interests in a manner 
consistent with their public opposition in the UK to a fair dealing parody exception.   
If rightsholders were not systematically protecting their copyright from parodic 
treatment prior to the proposed exception, it weakens the argument for strict 
protection on economic grounds.  The findings also add to our empirical 
understanding of so-called “safe harbor” regimes, which have developed into a 
dominant mode of Internet regulation (limiting liability of intermediaries under 
certain conditions).7 
 
Technical context: 
 
Founded in 2005 by former employees of the online payment system PayPal, 
YouTube is the world’s most popular online streaming video platform. The company 
was acquired by Google Inc. in 2006 for $1.65 billion and has since incorporated 
contextual advertising and search technology from its corporate parent.  According to 
published data, the service currently reaches approximately 800 million unique 
visitors per month and serves 4 billion streaming videos per day (YouTube, 2012). In 
2009 the New York Times reported that YouTube’s revenues might fall anywhere in a 
range from $200 million to $500 million USD per year, with the company reported to 
have reached profitability in 2011 (Arango, 2009; Jamieson, 2011).  The YouTube 
content base was built almost entirely from user contributions, and it is considered 
emblematic of the web 2.0 business model for leveraging user-generated content and 
social interaction (Burgess & Green, 2009). 
 However, not all content hosted on YouTube originates from its users: the 
possibility for content owned by third parties to find its way onto YouTube has made 
it the target of a number of significant copyright infringement lawsuits, notably by 
cable provider Viacom in 20078. In Europe, YouTube was sued by Berlusconi-owned 
                                                                                                                                                              
The case of Acuff Rose Inc. v Campbell (510 U.S. 569, 1994) established that the ‘transformative’ 
nature of the parodied work is decisive:  Does it add ‘something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or message’? 
7 [safe harbor / notice-and-takedown references DMCS/  information service provider under e-
Commerce Directive: reference to explanation in next section] 
8 Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103. 
 4 
RTI in 20089 for hosting clips and episodes of the Italian Big Brother TV programme 
and in France by TF1 in 201210 for hosting clips of programmes belonging to the 
French broadcaster. In almost all cases (with the exception of the Italian RTI case) 
YouTube has enjoyed immunity from liability for infringement by its users because of 
its status as an information service provider (“safe harbor”). In most cases, courts 
have found that due to the volume of material processed by platforms such as 
YouTube, service administrators cannot be held directly responsible for unauthorized 
use, when such specific knowledge of infringement is impossible to obtain.  
Claimants have been pointed to the notice-and-takedown mechanism as a remedy for 
the removal of infringing content on sites like YouTube.  
Over time, conflict with rightsholders has led YouTube to develop more 
sophisticated measures for preventing the uploading of copyright material in the first 
place and empowering rightsholders to locate and remove material hosted by the 
website via its fingerprint matching technology called ContentID.  
At the same time that YouTube has strengthened its ability to respond to 
rightsholder complaints, some commercial content has been brought legally onto the 
platform, through partnerships with traditional media companies. The most elaborate 
of these partnerships is the VEVO music channel, which hosts content licensed from 
Sony Music Entertainment, Universal Music Group, Abu Dhabi Media and EMI. The 
participating music labels benefit from a revenue share model that divides the 
proceeds earned from contextual advertising, pre-roll video advertising, merchandise 
and iTunes music downloads. VEVO, along with a similar channel controlled by 
Warner music and MTV, have proven extremely popular; data compiled by ratings 
research company ComScore shows that commercial music videos are by far the most 
popular type of content on the platform, accounting for more than 80 million unique 
monthly visitors in the USA, more than any other commercial channel on YouTube. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Monthly US traffic to commercial channels on YouTube in November 
2011 (Source: ComScore) 
 
                                                        
9 Reti Televisive Italiane contro YouTube, Trib. Roma, 24 novembre 2009, n.54218/08 (It.) 
10 TF1, TF1 Video, TF1 droits audiovisuels, LCI and e-TF1 v. YouTube (RG: 10/11205), 
Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris, 29 May 2012 
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The popularity of commercial music video content, combined with the large volume 
of user-generated content on YouTube makes it a compelling site to study the 
economic effects of derivative work such as parody. YouTube’s business model, 
which depends equally on user-generated content, locates it in a precarious position, 
on one hand needing to placate rightsholders concerned about the integrity and 
commercial viability of their licensed content and on the other hand requiring the 
patronage of users who demand the ability to use and remix copyright material in new 
ways. This dilemma remains a source of conflict between the various user 
communities and content creators on the service, with copyright law providing a 
general framework in which conflicts are resolved.  In the following section, we 
review the legal status of information service providers (ISPs) in copyright law, and 
we examine the notice and takedown mechanism that rightsholders can employ to 
remove unwanted infringing content from services like YouTube. 
 
 
Legal Context: 
 
Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the USA, Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) are granted exception from secondary liability for copyright 
infringement. They enjoy this safe harbour from infringement as long as platform 
owners respond expeditiously to formal requests from copyright owners to remove 
material, in a practice known as ‘notice-and-takedown’. Rightsholders who wish to 
have material removed must provide the ISP with specific information such as the 
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precise location of the infringing material (URL) and a warranty that the notifying 
party is the legitimate owner of the rights. 
In the majority of cases dealing with copyright infringement, YouTube has 
been deemed by courts in the USA and Europe to fall within the definition of an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) benefitting from exclusion from liability for copyright 
infringement as provided in Europe under EC Directive 2000/31 on electronic 
commerce.  Like the DMCA, the European legislation places the burden of 
responsibility on rightsholders to identify infringing material and notify the service 
provider of its presence. In order to comply with these provisions across different 
jurisdictions, YouTube has developed a highly streamlined online system to receive 
and respond to ‘notice-and-takedown’ requests from rightsholders.  
By placing the burden of policing copyright infringement on the shoulders of 
individual copyright owners rather than on network service providers, jurisdictions 
such as the USA and the EU that have adopted these safe harbour provisions aim to 
enable early-stage innovation on the Internet, limiting the costs of copyright 
enforcement. However, the present balance of responsibility has fallen under 
criticism.  Rightsholders have protested that this legislation burdens them with 
disproportionate costs, and that intermediaries – possessed of access to digital tools 
and user data – should be obliged to do more to proactively find and eliminate 
infringing content.  One the other hand, online free speech advocates have protested 
that the notice-and-takedown mechanism is open to abuse by parties that wish to 
suppress unpopular and dissenting speech, by using the copyright infringement claim 
as an excuse to force intermediaries to remove content (Miller, 2010).  Legal 
scholarship suggests that while notice-and-takedown is an effective measure to stop 
direct piracy of content, neither rightsholders nor Internet intermediaries are fully 
equipped to make judgments about ‘fair’ derivative or transformative uses (Von 
Lohmann, 2010). Resource-constrained and risk-averse, online platform operators 
may simply choose to comply with a takedown notice, rather than risk safe harbour 
protection by standing up for a user who may indeed benefit from a copyright 
exception. 
Takedowns of apparently fair dealing derivative works have proven 
particularly controversial in recent years. According to section 512(c) of the DMCA, 
a takedown notice must contain a statement by the copyright holder of a good faith 
belief that there is no legal basis for the infringing use identified by the complaint 
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(Sawyer, 2009). Subsequently, US courts have found that complainants may have an 
obligation to consider fair use before issuing such takedown notices, or face liability 
for misrepresentation of infringement. Currently, users who are unhappy about the 
removal of their videos from YouTube may file a counter-notification consisting of a 
warranty that they are legally entitled to make use of the work, however, small-scale 
users may be deterred from doing so because of confusion or fear of further legal 
action by rightsholders (Von Lohmann, 2010). 
 In the recent case of Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.11 a California District 
Court upheld a complaint that the music label had failed to take into account the fair 
use of material when it issued a takedown notice to YouTube over a video that the 
complainant had uploaded to the service.  The video, a short clip of the complainant’s 
toddler dancing, triggered the takedown request because the song playing in the 
background was Prince’s Let’s Go Crazy, owned by Universal Music.  The case 
highlighted an important feature of the existing notice-and-takedown mechanism: 
dependency on automated ‘fingerprinting’ technology used by rightsholders to locate 
infringing material (in this case by Prince) can result in ‘false positives’ that would 
otherwise be deemed fair use. A second issue highlighted by this case is that the whim 
of one particular artist can generate thousands of takedown notices while derivative 
uses of other artists’ work remains untouched12.  There is no consistently applied set 
of rules governing the removal of derivative online use of copyright work.    
 
 
Parody and its effects on rightsholders 
 
Parody is one transformative use that is particularly relevant to discussions of 
online copyright infringement, notably because there is so much of it on platforms 
like YouTube.  Parody is also controversial, because while it is recognised as having a 
wider role in political critique, the creation of a successful parody also necessarily 
draws upon and may copy aspects of an original work (Deazley, 2010). There are a 
number of arguments that support introduction of a statutory copyright exception for 
parody in the UK. The 2006 Gowers Review of Intellectual Property recommended                                                         
11 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
12 The particularly aggressive stance of Universal Music has been dubbed the “Prince Policy” 
due to that artist’s notoriously strict stance on online use of his work (Miller, 2010). 
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that the government adopt such an exception on the grounds that it would promote the 
creation of valuable new works and reduce transaction costs by removing the need for 
licensing in certain cases (2006:68). In his more recent 2011 review, Professor Ian 
Hargreaves similarly recommended the creation of a new fair dealing exception for 
parody, on the grounds that allowing unlicensed parody would generate growth for 
UK media industries, and would “encourage […] literacy in multimedia expression in 
ways that are increasingly essential to the skills base of the economy” (2011: 50).  
Parody is understood to be a fundamental part of political and cultural life in the UK, 
with the Government citing its “long and vibrant tradition” in UK comedy (IPO, 
2012:64).  
While both the Hargreaves and Gowers reviews stressed the generative effects 
of transformative use for the creative industries, some media industry groups took a 
strongly opposing stance toward the proposed legislation. In response to the 
Hargreaves Review, the Music Publishers Association (MPA) wrote: 
  
The proposed exception for parody would undermine the integrity and moral 
rights of publishers and cut across their normal licensing activities, whether 
for the purpose of synchronisation or straight forward adaptation of the lyrics 
or musical style. Carving out an exception which meant that “parodists” 
would not have to pay for comic use of musical material undermines the 
business model of a music publisher. (MPA 2012) 
 
Distilling arguments contained in the 471 industry responses published in the Government Consultation on the Hargreaves Review, and in particular those that 
opposed the introduction of a copyright exception for parody, we find patterns of 
three common concerns on the part of rights owners. Firstly, it is argued that 
permitted unlicensed parody will deprive rightsholders of a legitimate stream of 
licensing revenue.  The wider economic interest cited in the Hargreaves review, some 
respondents argue, must be balanced with the immediate threat to licensing revenue 
earned by rights owners when they negotiate permission to make use a work, 
including uses that might fall under the proposed fair dealing exception for parody.  
The Design and Artists Collecting Society (DACS), which represents the interests of 
visual creators (including photographers and graphic illustrators), stated in its 
response to the Hargreaves consultation that, “[r]ightsholders will lose an established 
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stream of revenue from the licensing of their work for parodies which go beyond the 
established limitations of substantial taking and criticism and review.” (DACS, 2012: 
44).  
The second argument made by rights owners in opposition to the proposed 
parody exception is that widespread unlicensed parodies might compete unfairly with 
original works in the marketplace, either by substituting for the original or by causing 
unwanted reputational damage.  These two related arguments were proposed and 
explored by Rogers et al (2009) in a study commissioned by Consumer Focus, the UK 
statutory body that represents consumers across regulated markets, and they are cited 
by commentators on both sides of the debate, although the authors themselves note 
that there is an absence of empirical evidence with which to evaluate the claims.  The 
first part of the argument, that unlicensed parody might substitute for an original 
work, seems unlikely given the nature of parody: the successful parodist must conjure 
up knowledge of an original work in an audience member’s mind in order for the 
parody to be effective, assuming prior knowledge of the original work.   There is the 
additional possibility that the circulation of a popular parody might stimulate 
consumption of an original work, when new fans of the parody are reminded of the 
original. The second part of the argument articulated by Rogers et al – that parody 
might cause reputational harm to an original – is difficult to test empirically, although 
there are normative questions to be raised about how far copyright protection should 
impede the free flow of market information about the quality of goods, such as that 
enabled by the current exception for purposes of criticism and review. 
The third argument made in opposition to the proposed parody exception in 
the wake of Hargreaves is that derogatory treatment of an original by parodists could 
infringe on the authors’ moral rights. Outlined in sections 77-85 of the UK Copyright 
Design and Patents Act (CDPA 1988), moral rights consist of the rights of an author 
to be identified as the creator of a work (paternity), to prevent misidentification as the 
author of a work, and to object to derogatory treatment of a work that he or she has 
authored (integrity).  It is principally the latter that opponents argue could be 
endangered by the introduction of a copyright exception for parody.   In fact, the 
wording of the newly proposed parody exception is explicitly written so that it shall 
not infringe on an author’s moral right. Nevertheless, it is foreseeable that some 
authors may object to certain parodic treatments of their work, and they may seek to 
prevent transmission of such work by asserting their moral rights. 
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The arguments articulated above are largely theoretical – prior to the 
Hargreaves consultation exercise, no rigorous empirical studies of the copyright 
aspects of parody existed. Much of the prior discussion of parody is either anecdotal, 
focusing on key cases and disputes involving single works, or represents the views of 
industry bodies or collecting societies (such as the Music Publishers Association and 
DACS, cited above). If we assume that the aggregate views expressed by collective 
bodies are representative of their members’ economic interests as a whole, then we 
should expect to find corresponding empirical evidence that supports those concerns 
expressed in the published responses to the Hargreaves review.  For example, if 
infringement of moral rights is a major concern, we might see rightsholders 
withholding certain works from parody, or objecting to certain derogatory types of 
parodic treatment. Similarly, if protecting work from substitution by parodic imitators 
is of concern, we might expect to see those parodies that copy substantial portions of 
on original work taken down with greater regularity than those that merely reference a 
work for inspiration.  The following section outlines the methodology used to seek for 
evidence of this type of behaviour in a large set of data gathered from music videos 
on YouTube, and describes specific variables used to test each of the three arguments 
outlined above. 
 
Methodology 
 
The present paper builds upon earlier work by Erickson, Kretschmer and Mendis 
(2013) to ascertain the quantity of user-generated parody content on YouTube and 
assess its effect on original commercial works.  In that study, the authors used British 
Charts Company data to obtain a list of 343 music singles that charted in the UK in 
2011 and had a corresponding licensed music video hosted on YouTube (either the 
VEVO or Warner licensed music channel). The authors then searched for parody 
videos referencing those commercial works by searching for “song name + parody” in 
YouTube’s internal search engine.  The researchers located 8299 user-generated 
music video parodies referencing the original 343 commercial music videos. A 
randomly-selected sample of 1843 parodies from within that larger sample was 
subjected to closer analysis to determine the nature of the parody, the severity of 
critique, the production values used and the extent of the original work copied.  The 
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authors also recorded the location (URL) of each of those 1845 parody videos to 
enable future analysis. 
The original study was carried out in January 2012, based on commercial 
songs and their parodies produced in the preceding 12 months.  One year after the 
original study, in January 2013, the researchers re-visited the list of parody URLs to 
check whether those videos were still live on the platform or whether they had been 
removed. This paper reports the result of that follow-up study, consisting of the added 
variable of the continued presence of user-generated parody videos, one year after 
they were first detected.  The research team identified and isolated videos for which 
the takedown was initiated by the uploader, for reasons other than a copyright 
infringement complaint, and those cases were not included in the study.  We can 
therefore report on the rate of rightsholder-initiated takedown, in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of music videos, accompanying parodies, and takedown rate  
Original top-
100 music 
videos, 2011 
All referring 
parody music 
videos, 2011 
Sample of 
parody videos 
recorded 
January 2012 
Remaining 
parody videos 
live in January 
2013* 
Parody videos 
taken down by 
January 2013* 
Takedown 
rate (%) 
343 8299 1845 1468 268 15.5% 
* excluding 113 user-initiated removals and other absent URLs, for which the cause could not be 
ascertained. 
 
The authors hypothesize that a number of factors could influence whether takedown 
of a parody video occurs (See Figure 2). Specifically, we identify possible factors 
intrinsic to either the parody video or to the original work. Features intrinsic to a 
parody that might influence its removal include its commerciality (presence of 
advertisement or other commercial use), the severity of its critique of the original 
work, its popularity, and the extent of the original work copied (lyrics, sound 
recording, video recording).  As suggested by Safner (2013), intrinsic features might 
not be the most determinant in precipitating a takedown: market conditions or features 
of the original work might motivate rightsholders to act.  The features of the original 
music track and video that we tested were sales popularity of the original work (based 
on its position in the top-100 UK charts), the territory of the original artist (UK, USA 
or EU without UK) and the genre of the original music video.  
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Figure 2: Factors influencing likelihood of takedown of a parody video 
 
 
 
Selecting from the factors that may influence the removal of a parody video, we can 
develop a number of hypotheses to evaluate the claims made by rightsholders in 
opposition to a copyright exception for parody.  The first argument by copyright 
owners against the introduction of such as exception was that more widely permitted 
parody would deprive creators of a source of revenue currently earned when they 
license work for use by others, including parodists.  While the music industry and 
collecting societies do not publicly share data about the frequency of licensing or the 
agreed terms, we can address this claim within our data by considering the intent of 
the parodist. YouTube hosts content of varying quality, ranging from purely amateur, 
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non-commercial video to semi-professional and commercial video produced by 
entrepreneurs and comedians.  Since this latter group potentially derives revenue from 
activities on and off YouTube, it is reasonable to expect that rightsholders would 
target these potential licensees more readily than non-commercial users where the 
likelihood of paying for use of an original work is low.   
If we assume that all monetised parodies and those with the highest level of 
production values constitute potential licensees, we can test whether their unlicensed 
use of the original work on YouTube triggers a more aggressive takedown response 
from rights owners.  
 
H1: Commercial quality parody videos attract more takedowns, reflecting potential 
loss of licensing revenue anticipated by rightsholders 
 
A second argument advanced by rights owners about the effect of parody suggests 
that substitution might damage the market for original works.  In order for a parody to 
substitute for an original work, it would need to i) share aesthetic similarities to an 
original work such that consumers could be confused by the provenance of the parody 
and ii) achieve a sufficient level of popularity among the audience for the original 
work such that it shows impact on the market for the original.  Consequently, we can 
test for the effect of two different intrinsic features of parody videos on likelihood of a 
takedown. If fear of substitution is motivating rightsholders to issue takedown notices, 
we would expect them to target parody videos that borrow a significant amount of 
original material, as well as those parodies that are most popular. We propose the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H2a: Popular parodies attract disproportionately more takedowns, reflecting the 
suspicion by rightsholders that they may substitute for original works. 
 
H2b: Parodies that copy a significant quantity of an original work, such as the sound 
recording in its entirety, are more likely to trigger takedown action. 
 
An additional economic rationale for opposing a fair dealing exception for parody is 
that parody produces reputational harm that can impact the market for an original 
work.  Reputational harm in the market is difficult to measure; the impact of a 
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negative review may take years to propagate and produce an effect. Our data provides 
an opportunity to detect whether rightsholders are concerned by reputational damage, 
independent of whether such damage actually materializes. A large quantity of parody 
takes the original work as an object of ridicule, so it is logical to anticipate that this 
might have an effect on demand for an original work. If rightsholders are concerned 
about the potential for reputational harm produced by online parody, we should 
expect to observe that they issue takedown requests more frequently for videos that 
target an original work negatively. We propose to test the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Parodies that comment on the original work will attract more takedown requests 
reflecting the reputational harm that target parodies might cause to rightsholders. 
 
A further opposition to the proposed parody exception is that it would threaten the 
moral rights of authors. Specifically, it is argued that a fair dealing parody exception 
would impede the right by creators to object to derogatory treatment of their work. 
Under the current regime, since parodists must seek permission from rightsholders 
prior to use in a parody, creators can enforce their moral rights by denying use of the 
work.  While we cannot test for the complete range of factors that might lead a creator 
to object to use of a work, we assume that parodies that are harshly critical of a work 
and its creator are less likely to be permitted than those that take a light-hearted or 
satirical tone.  We propose the following hypothesis:   
 
H4: Parody that takes an explicitly negative stance toward the original work or its 
creator will attract more takedown requests, reflecting authors’ assertion of their 
moral rights 
 
Finally, the dataset provides an opportunity to test whether the copyright regime in 
the UK produces a fundamentally different pattern of parody take down requests 
compared to the United States. The original study captured roughly equal numbers of 
original works by American and UK musical artists. If UK artists have benefitted 
from the lack of a statutory exception for parody, while those in the USA have had to 
contend with the more liberal provisions under fair use, then we would expect to see a 
disproportionately greater frequency of takedown requests from UK rightsholders, 
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reflecting their ability to object to parodic treatment of their work under UK statutes.  
We formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
 H5: UK music rightsholders issue more takedown requests than American 
rightsholders, reflecting the lack of a fair dealing exception for parody in the UK 
 
In their opposition to the proposed UK legislation, rightsholders and media industry 
representatives maintain that parody is an exploitative practice and that explicitly 
creating an exception to copyright would deprive owners of economic benefit derived 
from licensing their work to parodists and weaken artistic control over their own 
works.  However, if UK copyright owners’ behaviour is not different from that of 
rightsholders in different jurisdictions, for example where parody is more widely 
permitted, then that might prompt us to shift focus to the potential of such a parody 
exception to generate innovation and social benefit, without prejudicing the economic 
interests of original creators. 
 
 
 
3. Findings 
 
The data on YouTube takedowns, comprised of 1732 cases, consisted of categorical 
and continuous variables (appendix 1). The research team performed a series of Chi-
square tests which are nonparametric and thus do not depend on any assumptions such 
as normality or stationarity of the data. The choice of test was deemed the most 
appropriate for analysis of the data as normality testing of the variables proved the 
data were not from a normally distributed population. The dependent variable used in 
the analysis was the detection of a takedown (expressed as a binary variable: 1=yes, 
0=no).  Independent variables were selected from the features of the parody video 
itself as well as features of the original commercial work (Figure 2). The outcome of 
the chi-square tests for the distribution of takedowns across the sample of 1732 
parody videos is reported below in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Results of Chi-square test with features of parody video and presence of 
takedown. 
Variable: Chi-square p 
Production values 34.34 <0.001** 
Severity of critique 5.76 0.22 
Number of views (popularity) 29.76 <0.001** 
Type of parody 18.24 <0.001** 
Copied sound recording 6.41 0.01* 
 
Based on the results in Table 2, our first observation is that four independent variables 
appear to have a significant effect on the takedown of a given parody video. The p-
values suggest strong statistical significance supporting the association between 
production values, type of parody, popularity, and the likelihood of a takedown. In 
comparison to these three, the presence of a direct copy of the original sound 
recording in the parody video has a moderately significant effect. Furthermore, we 
find that the severity of critique does not have a statistically significant influence on 
takedowns. How does the observed pattern relate to the hypothesised behviour of 
rightsholders? 
First, we consider the hypothesis (H1) that commerciality of a parody video is 
more likely to prompt a takedown. While the production values present in a video are 
significantly associated with takedown, does the significance of the production quality 
of a parody, as a proxy for the commercial intent of its creators, support the 
hypothesis that rights holders are specifically targeting potential licensees?  In order 
to confirm that hypothesis, further examination of the distribution is required. In table 
3, we reproduce a cross-tabulation of the categorical variable ‘production values’ with 
the presence of takedown.   
 
 
Table 3: Likelihood of takedown and production values  
 Production values present in parody video:  
 1, lowest 2, low 3, average 4, high 5, highest Total 
Live 101(6.9%) 290(20.0%) 581(40.0%) 393(27.0%) 103(7.0%) 1468 
(100%) 
Taken 
down 
18(6.8%) 85(32.1%) 112(42.4%) 40(15.2%) 9(3.4%) 264 
(100%) 
 
Counter-intuitively we find the distribution of takedowns in our sample 
disproportionately concentrated among those videos with average and with low 
production values. The distribution suggests that there is a relationship between 
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production values and takedowns, however not in a manner that would confirm that 
rightsholders are concerned about commerciality of derivative parodies. It appears 
instead that rightsholders are more likely to request removal of poor quality videos 
than those displaying greater technical skill.  Another explanation is that with 
ContentID fingerprinting technology, rightsholders may be choosing to directly 
monetise high quality parodies, effectively licensing use of the work on a post-hoc 
basis. The disproportionately large number of takedowns of ‘average’ and ‘low’ 
production values does not support the hypothesis that higher production values 
attract greater rightsholder attention. It could be that rightsholders are also engaged in 
a form of brand management, trimming videos that they feel do not meet standards of 
quality aligned with their objectives as entertainment brands. The lower than expected 
number of takedowns in the category of ‘high’ and ‘highest’ production value leads us 
to reject H1 as the evidence suggests that commercial quality parody videos do not 
attract the most takedowns.  Additional research is needed to determine whether 
automatic licensing of derivative works explains the observed pattern.  
It was further hypothesised that copyright owners are concerned about the 
substitution of parodic treatments for original works in the marketplace, reducing 
their overall revenue (H2a).  This was tested by examining the strength of association 
between popularity of a parody video and the likelihood of its removal.  Indeed, 
popularity is significantly associated with takedown as reported in Table 2. However, 
as with production values, the direction of the relationship was unexpected. To further 
test the obtained result, the authors cross-tabulated parody popularity and takedowns 
(not reported here). Those results indicate that unpopular videos are taken down more 
frequently than popular ones, suggesting a similar pattern to production values and 
suggesting that post-hoc licensing or brand management may be motivating such 
behaviour.   Hypothesis 2a can be rejected, because although a significant relationship 
exists between parody popularity and frequency of takedown, removals are 
disproportionately distributed among videos with low numbers of viewership.  This 
contradicts the expectation that rightsholders are concerned about substitution effects. 
On the other hand, copyright owners do appear to be concerned about the quantity of 
original content directly copied by the parodist (H2b).  We observe a moderately 
significant association between the presence of a copied sound recording in a parody 
video and the likelihood of a takedown.  This is logical given that YouTube offers 
rights owners sophisticated tracking software that can detect infringing content based 
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on the presence of exact fingerprint matches, such as with an original sound 
recording.  Given the technological measures to enforce copyright using such content 
identification software, it is surprising that this association is not more strongly 
observed.    
Hypothesis 3 tests for a different, related effect in the marketplace – the 
perceived reputational harm caused by parodies that target the original work, 
compared with parodies that merely use the original to draw attention to some other 
phenomenon or social cause.  This was measured by comparing the rate of takedown 
within the categorical variable, ‘type’, consisting of four kinds of observed parodies: 
target, weapon, self- and mislabelled. We do observe a significant association 
between the type of parody and the presence of a takedown, however not in the 
direction that would support our hypothesis.  Table 3 shows the distribution of 
takedowns within the variable, ‘parody type’.  
 
Table 3:  Presence of takedown and type of parody 
   
 Type of parody:  
 1, target 2, weapon 3, self- 4, mislabelled Total 
Live 484(35.0%) 446(32.3%) 279(20.2%) 172(12.5%) 1381 (100%) 
Taken 
down 
81(34.2%) 52(21.9%) 67(28.3%) 37(15.6%) 237 (100%) 
 
The effect of the type of parody on the likelihood of a takedown is stronger than 
expected for parodies that mock the parodist themselves (self-parody), or that were 
unclear about the focus of their parodic critique in the first place (mislabelled).  The 
traditional categories of parody – those that target the original work directly and those 
that use reference to an original work as a weapon to draw attention to some other 
social phenomenon – are taken down less frequently than expected.  This result is 
counter-intuitive in relation to the argument that target parodies will naturally be most 
offensive to a rightsholder.  Instead, a different pattern of takedown is observed.  It 
appears that confusion about what constitutes parody in the mind of the would-be 
parodist is just as likely to trigger a takedown.  The result may be explained by the 
fact that a large number of self-parodies approach a karaoke performance or a cover 
in the eyes of an observer.  Similarly, some of those parodies mislabelled as such 
might consist of straight copies masquerading as parody, thus triggering a takedown.  
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H3 is rejected on the basis that targeting the original work does not result in increased 
likelihood of a removal compared to other types of parody performance.  
 The fourth argument advanced by rightsholder groups was the claim that 
parody threatened the moral rights of creators. The influence of moral rights concerns 
on the takedown rate is complicated by the range of potential objections that an author 
might have to a transformative use of their work. We assumed that ‘derogatory 
treatment’ in the eyes of a creator is likely to include use that de-values the original 
for a new audience13.  In order to measure the potential for such de-valuation of an 
original by a parody, we created the variable ‘severity of critique’, consisting of a 5-
point Likert-style scale measuring ‘likelihood that the parody will de-value the 
original work in the eyes of the audience’.  This was deemed a feasible variable with 
which to evaluate possible moral rights concerns by authors.  Other features were 
considered – such as presence of obscenity or sexual content, but these were deemed 
unreliable measures due to the influence of YouTube’s own moderation policies.  As 
reported in Table 2, we did not detect any significant relationship between the 
severity of critique and the takedown rate.  Consequently H4 is rejected. 
 Having examined the influence of features intrinsic to parody videos on the 
rate of takedown, we now turn our attention to features of the original commercial 
work itself.  Here there are a number of variables that may impact the decision by a 
rightsholder to remove a video from YouTube.  The commercial song might be 
monetised in other competing online channels, there might be third-party exclusive 
rights under negotiation, the music label may be in dispute with YouTube, or the artist 
themselves might strongly object to any use of their work on the Internet.   Those are 
specific conditions that are difficult to reliably detect on their own. Instead, the 
authors selected three general attributes of an original music video, summarised in 
Table 4.  These variables were selected because we are interested in detecting three 
broad types of motivation for a takedown action by rightsholders: sensitivity to the 
actions permitted in the legal jurisdiction of the rights owner, the possibility for 
arbitrary takedown activity by a single rightsholder or group of rightsholders                                                         
13 Section 80(2)(b) of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 provides that the treatment of a 
work is derogatory “if it amounts to distortion or mutilation of the work or is otherwise prejudicial to 
the honour or reputation of the author or director”. Reference to the wording of Art. 6 of the Berne 
Convention suggests that the author can only object to distortion, mutilation or modification of his 
work if it is prejudicial to his honour or reputation. Still one UK court has given a wide interpretation, 
considering the removal of a forest background from a photograph as a derogatory distortion (Delves-
Broughton v House of Harlot Ltd [2012] EWPCC 29). 
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(captured here with ‘genre’) and economically-driven takedown activity related to the 
retail success of the original work in question. While no publicly available data on 
sales numbers could be obtained, the researchers constructed the variable ‘retail sales 
rank’ derived from the top chart position achieved by a given original song, ranging 
from 1 – 100, and the number of weeks spent on the retail charts over the year, 
ranging from 1 – 5214.  
 
The retail sales rank variable is expressed as:  
∑ 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ (101 − 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑛𝑖   
 
 
Table 4:  Results of Chi-square test with features of original music video and presence 
of takedown 
 
Variable: Chi-Square p 
Territory 11.642 0.03* 
Genre 12.885 0.05* 
Retail sales rank 15.754 0.072 
 
As reported in Table 4, the two variables ‘territory’ and ‘genre’ are moderately 
significant, while retail sales rank is not significantly associated with takedown.  The 
authors hypothesised that the home territory of the original artist would be associated 
with the rate of takedown, because of differences in the copyright exceptions 
available to parodists in the USA and the UK. Hypothesis H5 is accepted based on the 
results of the Chi-square test as we find a statistically significant relationship between 
the home territory and rate of takedown. A closer look at the data reveals that indeed 
songs by artists from the USA have a lower rate of takedown (13.7%) compared to 
the UK (18.2%) and the EU other than UK (24.1%). Secondly, it is observed that 
video genre also has a statistically significant association with the rate of takedown 
and a closer examination of the results showed that pop music parodies are taken 
down more frequently than expected compared to urban, rock and electronic music. 
Finally, the variable retail sales rank is not found to be statistically significant as the 
p-value for the Chi-square test is above 0.05. This suggests that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between takedowns and the retail success of the 
song.  The result suggests that rightsholders are not picking from among ‘hits’ in their                                                         
14 The authors are grateful to Christian Handke for input on constructing this variable from retail chart 
data. 
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catalogue when deciding which derivative parodies on YouTube to target for removal. 
Based on the results in Table 4 we can conclude that at present, territory and genre of 
an original work are two variables which have a moderately significant impact on 
frequency of takedowns of user-generated parodies. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This article has examined the rate of copyright notice-and-takedown of amateur 
parody music videos, testing a number of hypotheses derived from rightsholder 
statements about the features of parody that they find threatening to the integrity and 
commercial exploitation of their work. The hypotheses generated from a distillation 
of published rightsholder opposition to a copyright exception for parody were only 
partially confirmed by our results. 
 The first observation is that rightsholders are not requesting takedown of the 
most popular or the highest quality parodies at the expected rate.  This contradicts the 
expected result, which is that rightsholders would be concerned with substitution of 
popular parodies for their original content, and that they would seek to suppress 
commercial-quality derivative uses in favour of licensing use of their material. It is 
likely that the ability of rightsholders to track and monetise derivative uses of their 
copyright material via ContentID partially explains the result.  High quality and 
popular parodies might remain live on the platform because rightsholders have 
determined that the revenue gains from monetising unauthorised parodies weigh 
against any potentially negative effects such as from substitution. However, what 
explains the disproportionate rate of takedown of parodies with ‘average’ or ‘low’ 
production values, which made up 74.5% of the removed sample? There are likely 
two factors at work here: poor-quality videos are generally less popular than those 
with high production values, and they also tend to lack clarity about the purpose of 
their parodic intent, often mislabelling a karaoke cover as a parody (Erickson, 2013).  
Parodists with less skill are also more likely to directly copy a sound recording, 
making their output more likely to be detected by rightsholders. The moderate 
significance of direct copying in the likelihood of a takedown confirms this 
possibility.  Rightsholders and their representatives may also be involved in brand 
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management in their online takedown policy – leaving up those videos that are 
popular or reflect well on the brand, while seeking to remove those that tarnish the 
quality of the original work due to their low production values.  Further research is 
needed to ascertain why production values appear to be an important factor in why a 
derivative use might escape a takedown request. The nature of parodic transformation 
is a common test in legal determinations of infringement (Mendis & Kretschmer 
2013). The empirical findings suggest that this is also important in commercial 
practice.   
 A second outcome of our study is that rightsholders do not appear to be 
concerned with the content of parodies, even when they target or critique the original 
artist or work. This somewhat contradicts the expectation, based on published 
opposition by rightsholder groups, that widespread parody threatens the integrity of 
works and therefore the moral rights of creators.  Even the most vicious and critical 
parodies were taken down less frequently than those approaching karaoke 
performances, suggesting that rightsholders are more concerned with direct copying 
and with commercial licensing than with reputational harm.  
 A final result is that the territory of the artist is moderately significant in the 
rate of takedown of derivative parodies. It is not a straightforward task to interpret this 
result, as the interplay of copyright ownership, jurisdiction and technological 
platforms is complex.  Artists based in the UK and Europe may be represented by 
subsidiaries of music publishing companies based in the USA.  Independently of the 
wishes of music labels, collecting societies can block web streams of content in their 
home countries, as the music collecting society GEMA has done for a significant 
number of music videos in Germany15. It does appear however that US artists and 
their representatives are more permissive about parodic use of their work on 
YouTube, evidenced by a lower rate of removal in our sample.  This could be due to 
the effect of ‘fair use’ on takedown policy, or other cultural differences between the 
territories.  The fact that genre was also significantly associated with takedown further 
suggests a cultural interpretation – pop and electronic music rightsholders were more 
conservative, while genres like rock and hip hop more permissive of parodic uptake.  
                                                        
15 As of December 2013, 61.5% of the top 1000 videos were blocked in Germany according 
to one large-scale methodology.  See http://datenjournalist.de/ueber-unsere-app-gema-vs-
youtube/ 
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The results obtained in this study suggest a number of potential directions for 
future research. We have presented data on takedowns and rightsholder behaviour for 
a limited subset of internet content.  While our results invite comparisons with other 
studies of notice-and-takedown, such as Safner’s (2013) study of online film piracy, 
in fact user-generated parody videos are a unique form of expression subject to 
dynamics that may be different in other domains where rightsholders seek to protect 
their work from direct infringement. Comparative research might examine other 
communities where consumers appropriate commercial work in order to generate new 
expressions, for example fan fiction communities or machinima video creators.  
 It is likely that the UK will introduce a new fair dealing exception for the 
purposes of parody, caricature and pastiche in 2014.  In its technical review of draft 
legislation on copyright exceptions, the Intellectual Property Office outlined its 
rationale, stating, “adopting this exception will give people in the UK’s creative 
industries greater  freedom to use others’ works for parody purposes.  Drafting this as 
a fair dealing exception […] is intended to allow creators to make minor uses of other 
people’s copyright material for the purposes of parody, caricature or pastiche, without 
first asking for permission.” (IPO 2013). This legislation aims to provide some clarity 
about the rights of parodists, including those who make their work available in online 
settings like YouTube.  Such legislation should enable non-commercial parodic 
works, at the very least, to remain visible to audiences who access YouTube from 
within the UK.  Given the high rate of takedown observed in our study and the 
continued discord between rightsholders and users in other territories, it is possible 
that the new legislation will not deliver this modest change. Reliance on ContentID 
and other automated mechanisms to detect and police potential infringement is likely 
to continue to interfere with copyright exceptions. When it comes to parody, it seems, 
users may not have the last laugh. 
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Appendix1: List of variables: 
 
Feature of parody or 
original 
Variable Values 
Parody  Commerciality of parody Rate the production values 
(1-5) 
Parody  Critical of original Rate the severity of 
criticism towards original 
(1-5) 
Parody  Popularity of parody Parody views (numeric) 
Parody  Type of parody What type of parody is 
this? (weapon, target, self-, 
mislabelled) 
Parody  Presence of copied sound 
recording 
Copied sound recording 
(1,0) 
Original Sales Retail index (a score from 
1 to 100 that reflects rank 
of original in UK all-
formats sales charts  
Original Territory  Territory of original artist 
(USA, UK, EU) 
Original Genre  Genre of original music 
(Pop, Urban, Rock, 
Electronic) 
 
 
 
